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The Institutions of Representative 
Democracy1 
Abstract 
This paper charts the development of the two institutions most central to the 
nature of representative democracy in South Africa: the electoral system and the 
National Assembly.2 It reviews how developments since 1994 have shaped the 
institutional context in which political parties operate and compete for power. 
The paper first considers how the National Assembly has developed over the 
past ten years, reviewing the performance of parliament and its role in the 
consolidation of democracy. The second part of the paper focuses on the 
electoral system, reviewing the debate around electoral reform and discussing 
changes that have been introduced since 1999. In the conclusion, we suggest 
what the implications of these institutional developments are for the future of 
representative democracy in South Africa.  
 
1. Parliament in the Past Decade 
In 1994, South Africa’s first democratically elected parliament was expected to 
play a very different role than the essentially undemocratic, unrepresentative and 
largely inactive parliament of the Apartheid regime. According to the 
Constitution, South Africa's parliament should overcome the legacies of the past 
by enriching the political system with the values of multi-partyism, 
accountability, responsiveness and openness. Parliament is designed to instill 
                                                 
1 The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those solely of the authors and do not 
represent the views of the US government. 
2 Throughout this paper we will interchangeably use the terms parliament and National 
Assembly. Although the South African parliament is bicameral, comprising the National 
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, we will not include the latter, less important 
chamber in our analysis here. For more information about the role and special character of the 
NCOP, see Murray and Nijzink (2002). 
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constitutional values into the political system and be a central agent in the 
realisation of human rights and the transformation of the country. In addition, 
parliament should provide a link between government and the people by 
educating the public about the democratic dispensation, by ensuring public 
participation in its processes and by being a role model for good governance and 
democratic values (Murray and Nijzink 2002). But how realistic are these 
constitutional expectations? Ten years after the first democratic elections, it 
seems appropriate to assess whether parliament has evolved in the way it was 
envisaged. Has parliament, being the country's main representative institution, 
lived up to its many challenges? How has it performed over the past ten years? 
1.1 From Legislation to Oversight? 
In the period immediately after the 1994 election, parliament played a central 
role in the new democratic system. A major part of its work was to serve as the 
Constitutional Assembly and finalise the new South African Constitution, which 
it did in 1996. The first democratic parliament was also confronted with the task 
of passing an extensive government programme of legislation intended to 
replace Apartheid laws and address the most immediate problems of a society 
deeply divided by racism, poverty and inequality. In fulfilling this legislative 
task, the first parliament passed a total of 494 bills, an average of almost 100 
bills per year. The legislative load decreased considerably during the second 
parliament. From 1999 to 2003, parliament passed a total of 313 bills, resulting 
in an average of about 63 bills per year. In other words, looking at the number of 
bills passed, parliament has become less active in the course of the past ten years 
(see Table 1).  
The decrease in legislative output between the first and second parliament is not 
surprising. One would expect the workload to diminish once the first legislative 
programme of the new ANC government was put in place. Thus, the relatively 
heavy workload of the first parliament must be seen as a result of the transition 
to a democratic regime, whereas the decline in the number of bills passed during 
the second parliament can be regarded as a sign of 'normalisation'. However, the 
decrease in legislative output also suggests that parliament could be in danger of 
losing its central role in the democratic system if it fails to take an active stance 
and shift the emphasis in its activities from legislation to oversight and 
representation.  
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Table 1: Number of Bills Passed by Parliament per Year 











Source: Annual Reports of Parliament. 
Note: * number of bills passed until November 2003. 
Such a shift is particularly important in the context of a system of governance in 
which the initiative in public policy making lies with the executive. The South 
African parliament, like many of its counterparts elsewhere in the world, has a 
limited responsibility for making laws. Legislation is primarily prepared and 
drafted by the executive and presented to parliament for approval. It is 
parliament's responsibility to provide opportunities for public debate and public 
participation in the law making process and to ensure that legislation that is 
passed reflects policy choices acceptable to the majority (de Villiers 2001). 
Some parliamentary committees, especially in the first democratic parliament, 
have been pro-active and have redrafted and amended government legislation in 
a number of policy areas, most notably in the Justice portfolio, but not all 
committees have equally impressive track records when it comes to the scrutiny 
of government bills (Habib and Herzenberg forthcoming). Committees and 
individual MPs also have the right to initiate legislation, which is, unusually, 
enshrined in the Constitution, but so far legislative initiatives from individual 
members and committees have been scarce (Nijzink 2004). In other words, 
parliament's law-making activities are, to a large extent, limited to debating and 
passing government legislation. Therefore, it is imperative that parliament 
extends the emphasis in its work beyond law-making to include monitoring and 
overseeing the executive and the implementation of its policies, especially after 
the main legislative framework of the ANC government has been put in place.  
The second parliament recognised that taking its responsibility of overseeing the 
executive more seriously could be the next step required to find its place in the 
political system in the longer term. In 1999, the National Assembly established a 
 4
sub-committee of the Rules committee to discuss parliament's oversight 
responsibility. The committee commissioned and discussed a report on how to 
strengthen oversight practices (Corder et al 1999). In addition, portfolio 
committees started to include oversight in their yearly programmes and some 
began to undertake so-called oversight visits (Annual Report for Parliament 
1999).  
These initiatives, however, have so far not resulted in vigorous oversight 
practices. The Report on Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability identified 
a number of resource and logistical problems that were restricting committees in 
their oversight activities but it did not address the crucial issue of political 
attitudes. As Nijzink has noted elsewhere,  
even if all the resource and logistical problems could be solved, 
committees would only be transformed into instruments of oversight if 
committee chairs are not afraid to occasionally antagonize the 
minister; if the opposition is not set on turning every committee 
meeting into a mini-plenum; if committees succeed in focusing on 
policy implementation; and if members regard their committees as 
efficient parliamentary units established to develop expertise and 
manage information, rather than extensions of the party political 
divide (Nijzink 2001: 63).  
These attitudinal changes have not yet happened. Instead, partisan power 
relations in parliamentary proceedings seem to have increased to the detriment 
of accountability and transparency.   
Certain parliamentary committees that are typically less driven by partisan 
considerations than others, such as the public accounts committee or the 
committee dealing with members' initiatives for legislation, have become 
dominated by partisanship. Public accounts committees are usually less driven 
by partisan considerations when they conduct their business and assess whether 
money has been spent in accordance with budget decisions. Yet, after the 1999 
election, rather than following common practice and appointing a member of an 
opposition party to chair the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), 
the ANC nominated an IFP member, Gavin Woods, as the chairperson. Since 
the IFP was a partner in the ANC-led government, the appointment was seen as 
a partisan attempt to influence committee procedures. The role of the SCOPA, 
has become the topic of even more explicitly partisan power play and debate, 
after alleged irregularities surrounding an arms deal appeared on the committee's 
agenda (Murray and Nijzink 2002).  
Furthermore, although a parliamentary Code of Conduct was introduced in 1997 
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and parliament keeps a Register of Members' Interests to prevent conflicts of 
interest among representatives, there have been several instances when 
parliament failed to hold its members accountable. Prominent members, such as 
Winnie Madikezela-Mandela and Deputy President Jacob Zuma, have not taken 
parliament's internal processes of oversight as seriously as they should. On a 
number of occasions, the need to act decisively on any allegations of irregularity 
involving MPs seemed to have given way to more partisan considerations. 
Several ministers, including Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota, have been 
accused of not fully disclosing their financial interests, yet without repercussions 
from the side of parliament. The Chief Whip of the ANC in the first parliament, 
Tony Yengeni, was accused and convicted of corruption but parliament left it to 
the ANC to decide on his resignation, while the party, in turn, thought it best to 
depend on Yengeni's own conscience for this decision. In the second parliament, 
a new scandal broke around the irregular use of travel vouchers by more than 
just a handful of MPs. Again, parliament seems to have been slow in acting on 
allegations of any wrong-doing.  
The lack of oversight practices and parliament’s reluctance to hold its members 
to its code of conduct not only circumscribes the institution’s independence, but 
is also beginning to undermine the public image of parliament. South Africans 
do not seem to regard parliament and its members as particularly trustworthy, a 
fact which further erodes the ability of parliament to exert its power in the face 
of executive dominance. Public opinion data from the Afrobarometer surveys 
show that the level of trust in parliament has decreased between the first and 
second parliament. The Afrobarometer asked people "how much of the time can 
you trust parliament to do what is right?" and found that the percentage of 
people answering 'most of the time' has sharply decreased, from 57% in 1998 to 
34% in 2000. The same trend can be seen in figures for parliamentary job 
approval. In 1998, 64% of South Africans approved of the way parliament 
performed its job. According to the Afrobarometer surveys, this dropped to 45% 
in 2000. Also, 45% of South Africans think that most or almost all MPs are 
involved in corruption. This perception has been more constant over time: 41% 
in 1997, 44% in 1998 and 45% in 2000 (Mattes et al 2000). Clearly, these trends 
especially in perceptions of corruption, indicate that parliament has a pressing 
problem with regard to its public image and its responsibility as a role model for 
good governance. 
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1.2 The Role of Committees and Parties in 
Parliament 
The previous section underscored the necessity for parliament to become more 
active in terms of overseeing policy implementation and holding its own 
members and the government accountable if it wants to ensure a central role for 
itself in the years to come. One way of addressing these issues would be to take 
the role and powers of parliamentary portfolio committees more seriously. The 
most important role of portfolio committees is to gather the information that is 
needed to make informed decisions about public policy and to develop expertise 
in the relevant policy area. Committees do the detailed work that underpins most 
parliamentary output and that is impractical if not impossible to do in plenary 
sittings. Because committees deal with the details of legislation and policy 
issues, party political differences will not always dominate, which leaves room 
for more problem-oriented discussion. Furthermore, committees can act as a 
contact point with the public, being the most practical forum for public 
participation. Thus, committees have the potential to provide a source of 
expertise outside the executive, a forum for public hearings, and less partisan, 
more problem-oriented discussion (Murray and Nijzink 2002).  
Portfolio committees have considerable powers, at least on paper, to develop 
their potential. These powers are listed, unusually, in the Constitution itself. 
According to section 56, the National Assembly or any of its committees may: 
(a) summon any person to appear before it to give evidence on oath or 
affirmation, or to produce documents; 
(b) require any person or institution to report to it; 
(c) compel in terms of national legislation or the rules and orders, any person 
or institution to comply with a summons or requirement in terms of 
paragraph (a) or (b); and 
(d) receive petitions, representations or submissions from any interested 
persons or institutions. 
Committees in the South African parliament do request organisations and 
individuals to make submissions or present reports, but they seldom use their 
other powers. They are able to function without relying on the tools provided in 
the Constitution. In the context of party political realities, these powers are 
clearly regarded as a last resort. Committees with a majority of members being 
members of the ruling party are understandably reluctant to summon ministers 
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or government officials (Murray and Nijzink 2002). Nevertheless, committees 
could be more assertive in compelling the executive to attend their meetings and 
report on certain matters. Portfolio committees often deal with a piece of 
government legislation without the minister being present. Some portfolio 
committees even extensively amend the government draft of a bill with the help 
of the legal drafter of the department without the minister being there. In many 
parliamentary systems, it would be unthinkable that the minister who takes 
political responsibility for a draft bill is absent from committee deliberations. In 
the National Assembly, it is apparently not regarded as a problem. In fact, it is 
sometimes in the course of the legislative process impossible to distinguish 
between the government draft and the version amended by the committee.  
In other systems, the extensive power to summon people is only given to 
parliamentary committees in the case of an official inquiry. In other words, these 
powers are reserved for more extreme instances where overseeing government 
policy implementation warrants setting up an inquiry process with witnesses and 
special hearings. In the South African system, such a process does not have to be 
decided upon in order to use the power to summon. All committees have these 
powers to use at their discretion, which might, paradoxically, be the reason why 
they are not being used. Because the extensive powers are always available, 
even the threat of using them is not an instrument in the hands of parliament vis-
a-vis the executive. It is as yet unclear if this is simply a consequence of the 
institutional design or if this points to a more general tendency towards fusion in 
South African executive-legislative relations.   
A clear trend in the past ten years of parliamentary politics is that parties and 
partisan considerations are increasingly dominating parliamentary proceedings, 
even in areas where one would expect individual MPs to be able to deal with 
certain aspects of their work in an atmosphere of slightly relaxed party 
discipline. Public accounts for example is typically less party politicised. The 
same is true for the avenue of private member bills and even for certain forms of 
parliamentary questioning when MPs can raise issues that emerged during the 
time they spent in their constituencies. In all these areas, we find that there is 
less scope for individual MPs to make their mark outside the realm of strict 
party discipline. During the second parliament, SCOPA proceedings have 
become overly politicised, as noted above. The committee on members' 
legislative proposals has not managed to avoid the process becoming subject to 
majority rule right from the start and even questions during question time are no 
longer allocated on a first come first serve basis but allocated to parties 
according to their relative size in the House. The ANC apparently saw its 
members making little use of  question time, while the opposition was more 
active in submitting questions. This situation seems to have been the reason for 
the ANC proposal to introduce a partisan element in the allocation of time to 
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members during question time.  
Changing the procedures for questioning in such a way seemed a rather 
defensive move from the side of the ANC, but typical of the style of the ruling 
party in parliament during the last five years. Regardless of its overwhelming 
majority, the ANC seems to have become more reluctant to engage in open and 
robust deliberations. Most of the opposition, on the other hand, seems to be 
stuck in a largely rhetorical and confrontational style instead of choosing the 
route of constructive criticism. Again, this polarisation could be a sign of the 
'normalisation' of parliamentary politics but one could also interpret it as an 
indication that parliament in loosing its central role and is not the main forum to 
debate issues of public concern. 
The growing irrelevance of parliament is also signalled by the fact that 
politicians do not seem to regard parliament as an important career goal. The 
ANC's practice of deploying its members together with turnover rates in 
parliament of 40 to 50% probably prevent this (see Piombo 2004). Although 
parliament seems to have become, to some extent, a training ground for 
ministerial talent, the governing party does not seem to regard parliament as an 
institution central to the overall goal of transforming the country. For example, 
during his first term, President Mbeki made it clear that parliament was not very 
high on his list of priorities. Mbeki reluctantly agreed to four question times per 
year when he would personally come to parliament to answer questions and 
gave his Deputy-President Jacob Zuma the task of dealing with parliament in his 
absence.  
1.3 Transformative Legislature or Arena Parliament? 
One way of assessing the performance of parliament is to look at what Polsby 
(1990) calls "transformative capacity". Does parliament have an independent 
capacity to mould and transform proposals from different sources into laws? 
And, if so, is this capacity frequently exercised? Polsby actually classifies 
legislatures using a continuum with transformative legislatures on the one end 
and arena type parliaments on the other end. In transformative legislatures, a 
crucial transformation occurs between inputs from the political system and the 
final result of the legislative process. The internal structures and cultural norms 
of the institution as well as the division of labour within parliament are crucial 
for the way in which the legislature functions. The output of the legislature is 
primarily influenced by the following factors: the committee structure and 
appointment processes, the policy preferences of individual legislators, informal 
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legislative groupings and the operation of rules of internal procedure and 
customs such as seniority.   
Arena parliaments, on the other hand, serve mainly as formalised settings for the 
interplay of significant political forces in the political system. The more open 
the regime, the more varied, representative and accountable the forces in the 
arena are. The main function of an arena type parliament is to question and 
debate government policy. In order to understand the policy making role of an 
arena parliament, one needs to study the social background of members, their 
links with civil society, the strategies of government and the civil service, the 
organisation of parliamentary parties and more importantly extra-parliamentary 
party politics. In other words, the impact of external forces is decisive in 
accounting for parliamentary outcomes.   
Polsby proposes that the main influence on the independence or transformative 
capacity of legislatures lies in the character of parliamentary parties. There are 
three important ways in which this works. First, the broader the coalition 
embraced by the dominant parliamentary group, the more transformative the 
legislature. Secondly, the less centralised and hierarchical the management of 
the parliamentary party, the more transformative the legislature. Lastly, the less 
fixed and assured the legislative majorities on certain issues are, the more 
transformative the legislature (ibid). When we apply this theory to the South 
African case, we see that the dominant party in the South African parliament is 
fairly coalitional, in other words, the ANC embraces a diversity of social 
interests, while the opposition parties are far less coalitional. Looking further at 
the way parties control the process of candidate selection and nomination, we 
would have to classify South African parties as centralised and hierarchical. And 
finally, when we look at voting patterns in parliament, we consistently see the 
same fixed majority, in other words, there are no shifting majorities. All in all, 
we would expect the South African parliament to have a limited transformative 
capacity and thus be placed more towards the arena side of Polsby's continuum.  
1.4 An Assessment 
Perhaps one would have expected the first and second democratic parliaments to 
shape policy or at least significantly contribute to policy making, especially with 
regard to the pressing issues of poverty, unemployment and social inequality. 
The need for widescale economic and social transformation seemed to call for 
an active role by the country's main representative institution. However, the 
South African parliament has not developed into a transformative institution, 
with the independent capacity to transform input from the political system into 
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policy outcomes. If anything, parliament has become less active and more 
reactive over time. This, on the one hand, raises questions about the centrality of 
parliament in the consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, one could take 
it as another sign of 'normalisation' of South African politics. Few parliaments 
around the world are the main agents of political or societal change. Initiative in 
public policy making lies primarily with governments and in the era of 
globalisation, many far reaching decisions are made in international fora.  
Furthermore, if the trend towards a reactive parliament is accompanied by a 
stronger emphasis on parliament's oversight responsibility it does not necessarily 
constitute a problem in terms of the consolidation of representative democracy. 
But, although parliament has begun to study and discuss its oversight 
responsibility and portfolio committees undertake so called oversight visits on a 
more or less regular basis, we have not yet witnessed vibrant oversight practices 
in parliament. 
During the past decade, parliament seems to have evolved more as an arena type 
of legislature in the sense that it has mainly served as a public forum to debate 
government policy. However, even as a public arena, parliament has not 
performed very well during the past 5 years. The challenge of overcoming the 
apartheid legacy of a gap of mistrust between government and citizens has only 
partially been met. The representative capacity of parliament and its members 
has not been fully utilised - not even within the limits of the current system of 
proportional representation, closed party lists and allocated constituencies- and 
the image of parliament amongst the public is not particularly good. Although 
parliament is obviously more representative in make-up than before 1994, it has 
not become the main forum for forging links between society and the state.  
In other words, there are many remaining challenges. Some of these simply exist 
for all parliaments in parliamentary systems and relate to overseeing executive 
action. There are other challenges that seem to be linked to the way MPs are 
elected, more specifically those related to the representativeness and 
responsiveness of parliament and its members. These issues have given rise to 
an ongoing debate on electoral reform, which we discuss below. Finally, some 
challenges might be more typical for parliaments in young democracies: those 
related to the development of the institution and its image amongst the public. It 
is in this area that the South African parliament has made some progress over 
the past ten years, specifically in terms of institution building. But much remains 
to be done before the country's main representative institution meets all the 
expectations set out in the Constitution and plays a central role in building a 
lasting democratic culture. 
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2. Debating Electoral Reform  
The question of electoral reform has been on the table in South Africa for some 
time and still shows no sign of having been resolved. Central to the debate is the 
growing realisation that the system of proportional representation based on 
closed party lists shows tendencies that could cause problems for the 
consolidation of democracy. Possible problems revolve around issues of 
accountability and visibility of MPs, and weak connections between 
representatives and their constituencies. These issues formed the core concerns 
that motivated parties from different sides of the political spectrum to advocate 
reform of the electoral system on the provincial and national levels.3  
The debate on electoral reform began around the December 2000 local election, 
yet did not result in any action until March 2002, when the ANC established an 
Electoral Task Team (ETT), headed by Dr. F. van Zyl Slabbert, to review the 
system and suggest whether or not any changes should be made.4 The team 
began its deliberations in May 2002, and was tasked to complete its report to 
Home Affairs Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi by November 2002. The task 
team considered three types of electoral systems: the current party-list system of 
proportional representation; a mixed system with single-member constituencies 
balanced by proportional elements; and a constituency system, including single- 
and multi-member constituencies to ensure proportionality. The team evaluated 
the different systems according to four criteria: fairness, inclusivity, simplicity, 
and accountability (van Zyl Slabbert 2002). The ETT commissioned Professors 
Roger Southall (Human Sciences Research Council) and Robert Mattes 
(University of Cape Town) to undertake a “comprehensive survey of voters’ 
involvement in, and understanding of, current politics and the electoral system.” 
                                                 
3 In 2000, a new electoral system for the local tier of government was introduced, which we 
discuss elsewhere in this paper. 
4 The other members of the committee were appointed primarily on the recommendations of 
the Department of Home Affairs and the Chair of the committee, and included: Raesibe Tladi 
(Director: Legal Services, Department of Justice and Constitutional Development; Tladi 
resigned on 13 August 2002 and was not replaced), Zamindlela Titus (Special Ministerial 
Adviser, Department of Provincial and Local Government),  Adv Pansy Tlakula (Chief 
Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission), S S van der Merwe (Commissioner, Electoral 
Commission), Norman du Plessis (Deputy Chief Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission: 
appointed by the Minister of Home Affairs), Adv Rufus Malatji (Chief Director: Legal 
Services, Department of Home Affairs), Professor Jørgen Elklit (Department of Political 
Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark), Professor Glenda Fick (School of Law, University 
of the Witwatersrand), Nicholas Haysom (Attorney in private practice), Dr Wilmot James 
(Executive Director, Social Cohesion and Integration Research Programme, Human Sciences 
Research Council), Dren Nupen (Director, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa), Tefo 
Raditapole (Attorney in private practice); Report of the Electoral Task Team, 1.3.2. 
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Working with four South African research survey companies, the survey was to 
be completed and analysed by late August 2002 (ETT Report, 1.5.1). The ETT 
also convened a two-day conference to debate various electoral systems and 
their likely impact in South Africa, the results of which were published in a 
report on 10 September 2002 (du Plessis 2002). 
The task team delivered its report to Cabinet in January 2003. The document 
reflected disagreement amongst the members of the team. The majority 
recommended moderate change to the current electoral system and rejected the 
option of a mixed system of single-member constituencies balanced by party list 
elements to ensure overall proportionality.5 They argued that the country already 
had a mixed system, since the nine provinces constituted nine multi-member 
districts (ETT Report, 4.5.1.1). The majority report recommended breaking 
down these large provincial constituencies, thus increasing the nine existing 
constituencies to 69 new ones, demarcated according to existing municipal and 
district council boundaries (ibid, 4.1.5.3). According to this proposal, the 
National Assembly would include 300 constituency representatives elected in 
the new districts, in addition to 100 members elected through proportional 
representation with closed national party lists. These recommendations 
including the rejection of single-member constituencies were based on the logic 
that the needs of fairness, representivity and inclusivity outweighed the concern 
with accountability, even though each was important. 
The minority, on the other hand, felt that the current system should be retained.6 
Advocates of the minority view argued that the six major political parties that 
had participated in the two-day conference, as well as the majority of South 
Africans, were happy with the current system. The minority also argued that the 
logic advanced by the majority view was not adequate to justify changing the 
closed-list PR system at the national and provincial levels. If the main concern 
was accountability, then parliament should strengthen constituency offices, 
rather than “tinkering with the electoral model” (ibid, 5.6. - 5.7). 
The Cabinet decided on 6 March 2003 to follow the minority recommendation, 
agreeing to retain the current electoral system and to reconsider changing it for 
the 2009 national and provincial elections. Buthelezi argued that there simply 
was not enough time to change the electoral system before the 2004 election 
(Bell 2004). The members of the task team had anticipated this reaction. In their 
report, they noted that from the outset, the team had been concerned that any 
suggestion for change that involved extensive re-education and re-demarcation 
                                                 
5 The majority report was endorsed by van Zyl Slabbert, Haysom, du Plessis, James, Elklit, 
Majatji, Fick and Nupen. 
6 The minority comprised members Raditapole, Titus, Tlakula, and van der Merwe. 
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of existing boundaries was simply impractical, given the time constraints due to 
the late date at which the reform evaluation had been initiated (ETT Report, 
1.6). 
The decision to maintain the current system reflected not only these practical 
concerns, but also additional factors. The Southall-Mattes survey had found a 
high degree of satisfaction with the current party-list system and a high level of 
knowledge about how the system worked. Southall and Mattes found that 74 
percent of voters were “satisfied with the way we elect our government.” This 
evaluation seemed to be based on voters' assessment that the system was fair, 
inclusive, representative and effective: 72 percent of voters felt that the current 
system was “fair to all parties;” 81 percent that it ensured “we include many 
voices in Parliament”, 78 percent that it gave voters “a way to change the party 
in power” and 68 percent that it helped voters “hold the parties accountable for 
their actions” (ibid, 2.3). Therefore, according to the views of most South 
Africans, there was little wrong with the current system. The impetus for 
electoral reform seemed to be originating primarily from political analysts, 
academics, and people actively involved in the political process.  
The ANC, on the other hand, had seemed reluctant to change the system even 
before the minority report recommended that no changes be made. The ANC's 
official position on the matter, taken by the National Executive Committee 
(NEC) in its July 2002 regular meeting, supported retaining proportional 
representation for national and local elections. The party argued that the system 
had been adopted before the 1994 election for purposes of inclusivity, and that, 
eight years later, the country still needed “to harness our inclusive political 
system in the interest of nation-building and national unity” (ANC 2002, 
paragraph 8). In theory, this position left room to adopt a new electoral system 
that combined constituency elements with proportionality, indicating that the 
party could genuinely be contemplating electoral reform. Yet, an ANC 
discussion document prepared for the 51st National Conference in September 
2002 argued for retaining the current system. While stating that the party would 
consider different options, the document concluded that “[t]he current system in 
place affords a great degree of stability. It allows for fair representation and 
gives a voice to all. It has certainly allowed for a greater degree of participation 
of women, people with disabilities and other targeted groups than any other 
system could. The system is also simple and familiar to voters” (ibid, paragraph 
26). In the light of this preference, the decision to follow the minority 
recommendation was not surprising and one could even question the sincerity of 
the official statement that the issue of electoral reform will be reconsidered 
before the 2009 election.  
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3. Electoral System Changes since 1999 
Although the matter of reforming the electoral system remains unresolved, 
between 1999 and 2004, there have been a number of changes in the institutional 
framework that structures elections and party politics in South Africa. The first 
was the use of a new electoral system for the local tier of government in 
December 2000. The second was the introduction of a window period to allow 
members of political parties to cross the floor in October 2002 and from March 
to April 2003. We will provide an overview of these institutional changes and 
highlight how they have impacted on the party political landscape and have 
structured electoral politics over the past five years.  
3.1 The 2000 Local Election 
The local election in December 2000 was the final step in the creation of a new 
system of local government, which replaced the transitional governing 
arrangements that had been in place since 1994 (Pottie 2000). The new system 
included a demarcation commission, which set the boundaries of the new local 
governments, and established 6 metropolitan councils, 41 district councils, 5 
cross-border municipalities and 232 local councils. The number of local 
administrations was thus reduced from 864 to 284 and the number of local 
councilors from 12,000 to approximately 8,000. The new metropolitan councils, 
also called unicities, amalgamated several urban local administrations into 
larger, more integrated municipal areas. Most of the new unicities were renamed 
in the process: Pretoria became Tshwane; Durban - eThekwini; Port Elizabeth - 
Nelson Mandela Metropole; and the East Rand became Ekurhuleni. 
Johannesburg and Cape Town retained their original nomenclature. Apart from 
the unicities, the new system comprises local councils in the smaller cities and 
towns and district councils covering wider geographic areas with lower 
population density.7  
The demarcation process began as early as 1998, while the remaining legislation 
governing the new local government system was enacted in 2000.8 This included 
the new Municipal Electoral Act, which established a mixed electoral system to 
                                                 
7  Information on these government structures can be found at 
http://www.gov.za/structure/local-gov.htm.  
8 There were four separate pieces of legislation that created the system of local elections and 
local government: the Municipal Demarcation Act (No. 27 of 1998), the Municipal Structures 
Act (No. 117 of 1998), the Municipal Electoral Act (No. 20 of 2000), and the Municipal 
Systems Act (No. 32 of 2000). 
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elect the new local councilors.9 This electoral system was engineered to 
maintain overall proportionality, in accordance with the Constitution, by pairing 
party-list electoral rules with plurality-based constituencies. Roughly half of the 
local councilors were to be elected through party-list proportional 
representation, and half through a first-past-the-post (FPTP) ward system. The 
novel aspect of this system was the provision for ward candidates. Any person 
who was a resident of the municipality in which the ward was located and who 
appeared on that municipality’s segment of the voter’s roll could register to 
contest for a ward-candidate seat. In order to register as a ward candidate, an 
individual needed only 50 signatures, 35 of which had to be voters registered in 
the ward. This meant that candidates did not have to be members of a political 
party in order to contest the election. In other words, independent candidates 
could now participate in local elections.  
About 690 independent candidates registered to contest the December 2000 
local election, including approximately 80 ex-ANC councilors and a host of 
politicians who had left the newly formed Democratic Alliance (DA) because 
they felt that the NNP had sold its supporters out by joining forces with the DP 
(Mail and Guardian, 24-30 November 2000; see also Gumede and Haffajee 
2000). Across the country, trade unionists, grassroots activists, and civic 
organisers began to form alliances with independent candidates and residents’ 
associations. Some of the ex-ANC councilors coalesced into a loose forum, 
called the Anti-Privatisation Forum. This forum and several rate-payers 
associations remained politically active after the 2000 local election.10 Even 
though many independent candidates did not actually win local council seats, the 
introduction of ward candidates made the system, at least at the local level, less 
party dominated.  
Another important aspect of the 2000 local election was a realignment in 
opposition politics. Many of the smaller parties saw the support they had 
received in the 1999 national and provincial elections decrease in the local 
election. For example, the United Democratic Movement (UDM) experienced a 
decline from the 3.42 percent it had earned in the 1999 national election to just 
1.4 percent in the 2000 local election. More importantly, in advance of the 
election, the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) had 
decided to merge, thus creating the Democratic Alliance (DA). A constitutional 
prohibition on floor-crossing prevented the parties from merging at the national 
and provincial levels, but nothing prohibited them from registering a new party 
                                                 
9 For the text of the Act, see http://www.gov.za/gazette/acts/2000/a27-00.pdf.  
10 Since December 2000, the Anti-Privatisation Forum has become one of the social 
movements that has led the revitalisation of South Africa’s traditionally vibrant, but in the 
1990s quiescent, civil society. 
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to contest the local election. Therefore, in June 2000, six months before the 
election, the parties formed the DA and subsequently ran a joint election 
campaign. This realignment represented the first time that opposition parties in 
South Africa agreed to cooperate beyond the level of temporary electoral pacts 
or an agreement to create a coalition government. The new alliance was an 
attempt to integrate parties at the organisational level. The fact that the parties 
involved in the merger represented minority opposition voters rendered the new 
party open to criticisms of being anti-black and pro-white, a defender of 
minority privilege (for example, see Business Day, 8 December 2000. Mbeki 
labelled the new party an “unholy alliance, united by hatred for the ruling party 
rather than a commitment to serve the interests of the people”). 
Despite these charges, the DA performed surprisingly well in the local election. 
It won nearly 25 percent of the votes nationwide, securing 1407 of the almost 
8000 local councilor seats, and control over many local governments in the 
Western Cape, including Cape Town (Lund 2000; Independent online, 7 
December 2000). The DA took control of the Cape Town municipality with 54 
percent of the vote against the ANC's 36 percent. The DA also secured more 
than 30 percent of the vote in three metropolitan areas of Gauteng, polling 35 
percent in Tshwane (Greater Pretoria), 33 percent in Johannesburg and 30 
percent on the East Rand (Granelli 2000). Overall, the DA increased its vote 
share by 5.69 percent compared to what the component parties had earned in the 
1999 national election. 
 
However, the new party soon proved unstable.11 The NNP, as the junior partner 
in the alliance, constantly felt derogated by what it saw as DP imperiousness. 
Compounding the divisions, the DA was unable to operate as a joint force in the 
National Assembly and provincial legislatures due to the fact that the constituent 
parties had to maintain separate party caucuses. By June 2001, the differences 
came to a head over a fiasco in the Western Cape, when DA major, Peter Marais 
(originally an NNP politician), started re-naming streets of Cape Town without 
following proper procedures. Marais has a long history as a populist politician 
and the DA leadership could not agree on how to deal with the situation. 
Compounding the problem, Marais was accused of corruption and sexual 
harassment, and again the constituent parties in the DA disagreed on how to deal 
with the allegations.  
                                                 
11 The supporters of the NNP and the DP had different perspectives on many policy issues and 
represented distinct interests in South African society (see Mattes and Piombo 2001 for an in-
depth analysis).  
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The tensions in the DA had been brewing for some time,12 and by July 2001 the 
conflicts over Marais, together with accusations of membership rigging and 
fraud, led to a vitriolic public exchange between high-ranking DA members 
from the DP and NNP sides (for example, see Independent online 10 October 
2001). In early November, the NNP officially quit the alliance, after working out 
an agreement with the ANC that as it withdrew its participation in the DA it 
would form a coalition government with the ANC in the Western Cape, thus 
ending the DP-NNP coalition that had ruled the province since the 1999 
election. This agreement enabled the NNP to retain  provincial power positions 
in its last remaining stronghold. Yet, quitting the DA also created a serious 
problem, as the move left the NNP without any representatives at the local tier 
of government. Therefore, one of the key components of the pact between the 
ANC and the NNP was an agreement that the ANC would introduce legislation 
providing for floor-crossing, thus enabling the NNP councilors who were 
“stuck” in DA positions to “come home” to the NNP (Daily News 20 June 2002; 
Smith 2002). 
3.2 Crossing the Floor 
In late September 2001, the ANC started working on legislation permitting 
elected representatives at all tiers of government to defect from their political 
parties without losing their seats. In January 2002, the Justice and Local 
Government committees of the National Assembly introduced the floor-crossing 
legislation. At this point in time, the DA seemed worried about the possibility of 
losing control over the Cape Town unicity as a result of floor-crossing, but the 
party did not actively oppose the legislation. In fact, when it came to voting in 
the National Assembly on 11 June 2002, the bill passed with the support of the 
ANC, NNP, and DA.13   
The floor-crossing legislation that was adopted in June was actually a package 
of four separate bills.14 Together, they provided for the creation of two fifteen-
day “window periods” between elections during which members of councils and 
                                                 
12 Since at least April 2001, indications of a rift between Leon and van Schalkwyk permeated 
the media (for just a few examples, see news24.com 2 April 2001; Beeld 2 April 2001). 
13 Before the vote, the members of the DA were divided over whether or not the party should 
oppose the bill (Pressly 2002). 
14 The Constitution of RSA Amendment Bill, the Constitution of RSA Second Amendment 
Bill, the Loss or Retention of Membership in National and Provincial Legislatures Bill, and 
the Local Government: Municipal Structures Amendment Bill. 
 18
legislatures could apply to switch from one party to another.15 The legislation 
required that in order for a member to defect, at least ten-percent of the party’s 
representatives in the council or legislature would have to agree and follow the 
move. However, for the initial “transitional” period, this ten-percent minimum 
would be waived. The waiver signaled a degree of political expediency and the 
lack of principled motivation of the new legislation. 
The floor-crossing legislation set off a constitutional controversy. On the eve of 
the first window period, which was to commence at midnight on June 21, 2002, 
the UDM launched an urgent application with the Cape High Court to suspend 
the legislation. The UDM argued that it had been passed for reasons of political 
expediency and that it was unconstitutional, since the Constitution stipulated 
that the electoral system should be based on proportionality. At this point, the 
DA decided to oppose the legislation, even though the party had voted for it in 
the National Assembly. The DA and a number of small parties joined the 
UDM’s application, arguing that the legislation violated the Constitution and 
had been passed to obliterate small opposition parties and cement a political deal 
between the ANC and the NNP. The ANC's counter-argument was that since the 
will of the people could change in the period between elections, the system 
should enable adjustments to the composition of councils and legislatures. 
Furthermore, as the Constitution did not stipulate the exact details of the 
electoral system but merely that the National Assembly must legislate a system 
that “results, in general, in proportional representation”, the floor-crossing 
provisions were, according to the ANC, not inherently unconstitutional.  
There are indications that the ANC did in fact agree to the floor-crossing 
legislation because it would help to limit competition from opposition parties, 
especially the DA. The ANC Chair of the Justice Committee of the National 
Assembly, Johnny de Lange, admitted that the legislation was motivated by the 
agreement with the NNP and a wish to deal with “the DA problem” (Comments 
reported in Mail and Guardian 6 June 2002 and Paton 2002). The ANC's desire 
to capture the provinces not yet under its control and to recapture control over 
the Cape Town municipal council clearly played an important role in the party's 
decision to create floor-crossing opportunities.  
On 20 June 2002, the Cape High Court suspended the first floor-crossing 
window period and ruled in favour of the UDM. The Cape Court put the 
legislation on hold until the case could be reviewed by the Constitutional Court. 
Several politicians who had already submitted requests to switch parties were 
caught out by this interdict, and as a result, the High Courts in the Western Cape 
                                                 
15 The window period would open in September of the second and fourth year after an 
election. 
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and KwaZulu-Natal had to guarantee that these representatives could not be 
forced to resign from their respective parties until the matter had been settled. 
The Constitutional Court did not take up the case until the first week of August 
and delivered a ruling on 4 October 2002. The Court argued that the political 
motivations behind the floor-crossing legislation were beyond its purview, and 
that it would focus solely on the issue of constitutionality. The Court found that 
the legislation was not inconsistent with the Constitution’s proportionality 
principle, but that there had been a procedural flaw in using ordinary legislation 
rather than a constitutional amendment to effect the change at national and 
provincial levels. Therefore, the Court allowed the defection process to proceed 
at the local level, but ruled that a constitutional amendment was required for 
defections to take place in the provincial and national legislatures.   
After the ruling, the Minister of Justice introduced the Constitution of RSA 
Fourth Amendment Bill, which provided for floor-crossing at national and 
provincial levels. The Minister also extended protection to the provincial and 
national representatives who had been exposed in June, stating that they could 
not be removed from their parties until the amendments had been voted on in 
parliament. At the same time, the window for municipal floor-crossing opened 
on 8 October and closed on 22 October 2002. Parliament passed the Fourth 
Amendment Bill on 20 March 2003, and the national and provincial floor-
crossing window promptly opened on 21 March.  
The cumulative result of both floor-crossing periods was an overall weakening 
of the opposition and strengthening of the ANC. The ruling party's controversial 
goal of a two-thirds majority became a reality. After the March-April window 
period the ANC's presence in the National Assembly had increased from 266 to 
275 MPs, representing 68 percent of the NA seats. The opposition, which after 
1999 had already experienced growing fragmentation, further disaggregated, as 
six new parties emerged at the national level, three of which held a seat in the 
NA.16 The winner among the opposition was the DA, which gained 8 MPs, 
increasing its representation in the NA from 38 to 46 seats.17 The ACDP also 
picked up one new MP, thus arriving at 7 seats. The UDM, which lost 10 of its 
14 MPs, was worst hit, together with the Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB), 
                                                 
16 These parties were: The Independent Democrats, the New Labour Party (Peter Marais), the 
Alliance for Democracy and Prosperity (Nelson Ramodike in Limpopo), the African 
Independent Movement (Teresa Millin, formerly of the IFP), Nasionale Aksie/National 
Action (Cassie Aucamp from the AEB), and the Peace and Development Party (founded by 
ex-IFP members Jan Slabbert and Farouk Cassim). For a description of these parties, see 
Merten (2003). 
17 During the window period in March-April, the DP dissolved itself and reconstituted as the 
DA, finalising the process that had begun in June 2001.  
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whose sole MP created a new party. The NNP saw its representation decline 
from 28 to 20 seats and the IFP lost three members, thus holding on to 31 seats. 
The PAC lost its most visible and popular politician, Patricia de Lille, who 
created a new party, the Independent Democrats.  
Table 2: Seat Allocation National Assembly Before and After 2003 Floor 
Crossing  
Party Before After 
ACDP 6 7 
AEB 1 - 
ANC 266 275 
AZAPO 1 1 
DA 38 46 
FA 2 2 
FF 3 3 
IFP 34 31 
MF 1 1 
NNP 28 20 
PAC 3 2 
UDM 14 4 
UCDP 3 3 
Source: Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, State of Parties Represented in the 
National Assembly, 5 April 2003.  
Note: This table includes only those parties already represented in the NA before the floor 
crossing window period opened. 
At the provincial level, the changes were perhaps even more significant. The 
ANC picked up enough defectors to enable the party to win shared control over 
the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, the two provinces that had eluded the 
party in 1999. Thus, the ANC realised its goal of creating a “Parliament of 
Hope,” with the party controlling the NA and all nine provincial governments. 
At the local level, 555 councilors crossed the floor, with most (61%) moving 
from the DA to the NNP. The ANC gained 22% of the floor-crossers in the 
municipal defections. The NNP reconstituted itself at the local level, earning 
back 340 of its members from the DA and picking up a few additional 
councilors from other parties (Independent online, 24 October 2002). Five new 
parties formed at the local level,18 and 21 local councils changed control; most 
                                                 
18 These were the Universal Party, the Black Consciousness Party, the Sport Party, the 
Phumulela Rate Payer’s Association, and the Belastingbetalersvereneging (Tax Payers’ 
Association).  
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of these were situated in the Western Cape, representing transfers from DA to 
ANC-NNP control. Interestingly, given heated exchanges between the ANC and 
the DA, three of the transitions were to ANC-DA coalitions.  
4. Conclusion 
What has been the effect of all these developments and, more importantly, what 
does it mean for the future of representative democracy in South Africa?  
Regarding the electoral system, the long-term effects of the incremental changes 
have yet to be discerned. The short-term impact of enabling floor crossing is 
clear: the ANC benefited, while the opposition fragmented even further. With 
the constitutional ban on floor crossing in place until 2003, party realignments 
between elections were practically non-existent, as politicians were reluctant to 
jump ship, and thus lose their jobs, mid-term (Piombo 2002). The new floor 
crossing provisions have taken away the institutional obstacles for such 
realignments. Therefore, in principle, they could have the effect of increasing 
the fluidity of a party system that has crystallised at an early stage in South 
Africa’s democratic development. However, when the ten-percent threshold is 
enforced, the stabilising effects of the pre-existing system of proportional 
representation based on closed party lists are likely to be reproduced. It would 
probably be difficult to convince ten percent of a party's representatives to defect 
to another party or form a new party altogether, especially ten percent of ANC 
MPs or MPLs. Convincing ten percent of 279 MPs to defect would clearly 
require more effort than persuading ten percent of 20 members. Therefore, 
future realignments in the window periods for floor crossing are more likely to 
affect the smaller parties, and will probably not be to their benefit. It is too early, 
however, for definitive predictions in any direction.  
However, there might be a more positive consequence of the institutional 
changes. In the longer term, the introduction of the provision for floor crossing 
could work to dilute some of the control party elites have over the career 
prospects of ordinary MPs. This could, in turn, facilitate parliament developing 
into a stronger institution capable of keeping executive dominance in check. 
Parliamentary committees may be more willing to engage in oversight practices 
and challenge party hierarchy if members are not completely dependent on their 
parties to hold on to their parliamentary seats. This degree of autonomy is 
important, because if parliament, being one of the country's main representative 
institutions, fails to fulfil its potential and live up to its responsibilities, the 
quality of South African democracy is likely to suffer.   
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Strengthening parliament and increasing the autonomy of its members could 
help to improve parliament's public image which further undermines the 
institution. Electoral reform could also solve image problems and aid 
accountability, by increasing the connections between parliamentarians and 
citizens. Under the current electoral system, there seems to be little sense of 
ownership of parliament amongst the public. In an Afrobarometer survey held in 
2000, only 0.2% of South Africans reported having made contact with an MP 
(Mattes, op. cit.). This extremely low level of interaction between voters and 
their elected representatives provides another rationale to reconsider the 
electoral system and reopen the debate about electoral reform in advance of the 
2009 election. For as long as parliament remains distant from ordinary South 
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